The NYMAS Newsletter
Published by The New York Military Affairs Symposium
New Book by NYMAS Member
C. Kay Larson, CUNY Graduate Student and NYMAS Board member, is the author of "Til I Come Marching Home" A Brief History of American Women in World War II (Pasadena, MD: The Minerva Center, 1996).
This is a ground breaking, thoughtful book. It takes as its subject matter the entire topic of women in the war, rather than just one aspect of it. The book takes a look at American women --of all races-- in the factories and fields, in uniform, in the medical services, even in Nazi concentration camps, the French underground and Philippine resistance, the merchant marine, and as intelligence agents. Rather than delving deeply into one particular aspect of the role of women in the war, the book surveys the many ways in which American women contributed to victory, the conditions under which they made their contributions, and the many problems while doing so.
"Til I Come Marching Home," which is profusely illustrated, and has an interesting foreword by John Eisenhower, is of value not only as an introduction to the largely neglected role of women in the war, but also as a guide for those interested in pursuing the subject further, since it contains extensive notes, a bibliography, and a set of suggested readings.
It is available for $10.00, paperback, from The Minerva Center, 20 Granada Road, Pasadena, MD, 21122-2708.
Young Abe at War
by A.A. Nofi
In 1830 Congress passed the Indian Removal Act, which called for the relocation of all Eastern Indians to lands west of the Mississippi, for which the munificent sum of $500,000 was appropriated to pay "compensation." Removal brought great suffering upon tens of thousands of Indians. As one result of this, there was a great deal of bloodshed in Illinois and Wisconsin. Dissatisfied with the land allocated to them by the Federal government, which they had to dispute with their blood enemies the Sioux, Omaha, and Menominee, and longing for their ancestral Illinois --guarantied to them in perpetuity by a treaty dating from 1804--, 500 Sauk and Fox warriors crossed the Mississippi into Northern Illinois in April of 1832. Under the leadership of Black Hawk (c. 1767-1838), a Sauk warrior, and accompanied by some 1,500 women and children, the movement was more of a migration than a raid. Nevertheless, panic spread rapidly among the white settlers. As nearly 5,500 militiamen and volunteers turned out, the Federal government began moving over 1,300 regular troops from Jefferson Barracks in Missouri and various coast defense posts in the East. The Indians won a skirmish with the militia at Stillman's Run, but, concluding that the odds against them were too great, decided to retire into Wisconsin. A few days later the militia caught them as they were attempting to cross a river. Although the Indians came off with the worst of it in the ensuing Battle of Wisconsin Heights, they did succeed in escaping. By this time some 400 regulars had turned up. Not being a stupid man, Black Hawk endeavored to surrender, only to have his offer rejected twice. Aided by about 900 militia, the regulars, under Brig. Gen. Henry Atkinson, began driving the Indians westwards.
Meanwhile Zachary Taylor was having some trouble getting his Illinois militamen to follow him into Wisconsin. However, by 2 June, having convinced them (by threatening to shoot anyone who didnt volunteer), he led a column through swampland to corner Black Hawk's band against the Bad Axe River, just south of La Crosse, Wisconsin. The next day there occurred the so-called Battle of the Bad Axe, a massacre which left only 150 survivors. Many of the Indians were driven into the river at bayonet point and shot down in the water or drowned. Thus was Illinois was made secure for civilization: American casualties in the war were 26 killed and 38 wounded. Black Hawk himself was soon captured and imprisoned for about a year in Fort Monroe. Upon his release, he settled in Iowa, where he helped drive out the Sioux, Omaha, and Menominee to establish a Sauk reservation. However, his influence over his people soon passed to the younger Keokuk, who became a great favorite with the Americans.
Among the many men who served in the volunteer militia during the Black Hawk War was Abraham Lincoln, then aged 23.
Lincoln volunteered on 21 April, joining the 1st Regiment of the Illinois Mounted Volunteers Brigade (which had no horses), and was immediately elected a company commander by a 2-to-1 vote. He appears to have been popular with the approximately 70 men in his company, not least for his willingness to help with the chores. On one occasion whilst on the march, Lincoln wrestled another captain to see which company would get a more desirable campsite: he lost, but History has failed to note the name of the man who beat him. Although the story is probably as old as close-order drill, Lincoln is alleged to have been the green officer who forgot the proper sequence of commands which would get the troops through a defile and so ordered "This company is dismissed for two minutes, when it will fall in again on the other side of the gate."
During his captaincy, Lincoln several time ran afoul of military law. On one occasion he was placed under arrest for a day. Another time, several of his men having failed to report for roll call due to drunkenness, he was tried by court martial and sentenced to wear a wooden sword for two days. Lincoln's company was mustered out on 27 May.
Military life appears to have agreed with Young Abe sufficiently to prompt him to reenlist on 29 May, joining Elijah Iles' Company of Independent Rangers as a private. Mustered out about two weeks later, on 16 June he once again reenlisted, serving as a scout in Jacob M. Early's Independent Spy Corps until mustered out in 30 days. Altogether Lincoln served about 80 days. Much of his time was spent slogging through swamps in search of Black Hawk and his men. He did, however, endure some physical hardship and helped to bury five men who had been killed and scalped by the Indians. And although his physical courage was not tested, his moral courage certainly was: When some of his troops attempted to kill a "friendly" Indian he intervened to prevent the atrocity.
In later life, Lincoln rarely referred to his military service, and then only with some self-denigrating bit of humor. Nevertheless, he seems to have been mildly proud of it. His brief brush with the military life seems to have served him well when he later found himself the commander-in-chief of the greatest armies and navies the republic had ever put in the field. Carl Sandberg observed that Lincoln " . . . had seen deep into the heart of the American volunteer soldier; he had fathomed a thousand reasons why men go to war, march in the mud, sleep in the cold rain, and kill when the killing is good. "
The Italian Navy in World War II by James J. Sadkovich. Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, 1994. xx, 379 pp. Illus, tables, notes, bibliog., index. $59.95. ISBN 0-313-28797-X.
This revisionist history of the naval war in the Mediterranean is intent on proving that the Italian Navy, the Regia Marina Italiana (RMI) was not as pusillanimous as it has invariably been represented by British and American historians. In many ways the work accomplishes that end, and a much clearer picture emerges both of the limitations and weaknesses with which the Italians had to contend, and of their hitherto underacknowledged successes.
Unfortunately, the positive effect of this long overdue reassessment is marred by a tone of negative carping. Dr. Sadkovich falls head first into the usual revisionist trap; he not only redresses the balance in favor of Italy, he immoderately weights the scale too heavily in support of her. He is not content to show that English language versions of the Mediterranean war are skewed against the Italians both for reasons of cultural snobbery (though his misleading reference to Morison's supposed characterization of the "dago navy," p. xv, weakens a plausible argument), and because of a failure to make proper allowance for Italian economic and industrial weakness. In addition, Sadkovich also denigrates the ability and performance of the British Navy at almost every opportunity, whether justified or not. Apparently the author cannot make his case for the RMI not being so bad, without also insisting that the British Navy was hardly any good at all.
Calling on his previous research in the field, and on his impressive familiarity with Italian sources, Sadkovich aptly underscores inherent Italian limitations, particularly when compared to German strengths. As he points out in his preface, imagine Hitler invading France with only three armored divisions and with an air force no greater than the US Navy's air arm in 1940. Yet, according to Sadkovich, English speaking historians persist in unfavorable comparisons between Italian and German military accomplishments as though the two nations were on an equal footing.
Sadkovich stresses the inherent weakness of the RMI by describing Italy's embryonic industrial base and lack of essential raw materials. The Italians built no carriers because --operating exclusively in the narrow middle seas-- they overrated the ability of their air force to provide close support from land. But also, as Sadkovich demonstrates, they simply could not afford to build carriers. This lack of seaborne air made it practically impossible for the RMI to force the British out of Malta, a failure much emphasized by Anglo-American historians.
Another Italian disadvantage was the grudging and totally inadequate support from Germany. In spite of promises of essential supplies, especially fuel oil, the Germans even failed to meet contractual obligations, all the while seeking to dominate Italy's war efforts. Given these "material deficiencies" Sadkovich sees the ultimate defeat of the RMI as "inevitable."
And yet, Sadkovich maintains that the Royal Italian Navy was successful in its one most important task in the Mediterranean: keeping open the sea routes to North Africa. The tiny RMI, under-equipped, totally lacking radar and with little and inadequate sonar, sometimes even unable to leave port for lack of fuel reserves, and essentially unprotected from the air, gallantly ran the gantlet of the assembled might of the British Navy, to escort the convoys on which the whole North African operation depended. That the British, in spite of all their advantages, were never able to cut off these convoys, is the greatest testament to the courage, tenacity and appropriate aggressiveness of the RMI.
This is a valid and important point, and should be especially useful to counteract what does appear to be a knee-jerk caricature of Italian military ineptness and lack of will in much Anglo-American historiography. It may, indeed, even justify the exhaustive description of the physical characteristics of Italian vessels though this will scare off the general reader. As the author himself suggests, this is not a book for the fainthearted.
Happily, it is not necessary to wade through all the exact and minute specifications of armament, calibers, rates of fire, thickness of armor, speed etc., in order to grasp Sadkovich's argument that Italian technical ability has been much maligned given the limiting political and economic parameters within which it had to operate.
All this is well and good, but where the book fails is in its evaluation of the British effort in the Mediterranean. Sadkovich consistently underrates and underplays the significance of British successes such as the defense of Malta, the attack on Taranto, and the engagement off Cape Matapan. Of Taranto Sadkovich makes the characteristic remark that the British success "had more to do with technical advantage and pure luck than with meticulous planning, genial leaders, or superior morale" (p.92). Having done impressive research in the Ultra decrypts which he compared for accuracy to captured Italian military documents, Sadkovich has apparently come to the comforting conclusion that it was Ultra information, and not the British Navy, that brought defeat to the RMI in the Mediterranean; Oh yes, and radar too. and carriers, and plenty of fuel oil, and good support from the United States and the Commonwealth.
But what of British disadvantages? The life and death struggle going on in the Atlantic? The British naval commitments around the globe? There is hardly a mention of these. Sadkovich is right to emphasize the RMI's successful convoy activities, but he could also broaden and deepen an understanding of this by drawing comparisons with the very different conditions in the Atlantic. Instead he seems to suggest, by omission, that the campaign in the Mediterranean was the only naval campaign in which the British Navy was engaged.
Still, in spite of the authors obvious and sometimes distracting bias --excessive even in view of his crusade to rehabilitate the RMI- - this is a book full of scholarly detail and provocative insights which will reward the careful, and skeptical, reader.
--Kathleen B. Williams
Quotation from Chairman
"War is a lottery in which nations ought to risk nothing but small amounts."
Steel Wind: Colonel Georg Bruchmuller and the Birth of Modern Artillery by David T. Zabecki. Wesport: Praeger, 1994. 224 pp. Maps, illus, notes, bibliog., index. $19.95. ISBN: 0-275-94750-5
This very fine book is a study of the German Army's artillery tactics and techniques developed later in the war by Colonel Georg Bruchmuller. These played in important part in the eventual restoration of mobility to the western front in 1918, along with the development of infiltration tactics by the infantry.
Zabecki's book is a very well-researched piece of work. The author evidently spent a great deal of time working in Bruchmuller's papers at the Bundesarchiv-Militararchiv in Freiberg, Germany. He very clearly lays out how Bruchmuller's ideas were a clear departure from previous artillery practice. Zabecki also spends a good deal of time on the nuts and bolts of how these attacks were put together in the planning process, and the kind of resistance that Bruchmuller had to deal with in getting his ideas accepted.
Oddly enough, even though Bruchmuller's attacks resulted in demonstrable tactical successes, the Germans abandoned his ideas, feeling they were suitable only to static situations. Some of the other powers did copy and experiment with his concepts, the most consistent in this regard being the Russians. Altogether this is a very fine study deserving of a very careful read. It is to be highly recommended to anyone with even a passing interest in World War I as well as artillery.
Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930-1945 by Walter S. Dunn, Jr. Westport: Greenwood, 1994. 256 pp. Bibliog., index. $55.00 ISBN 0-275-94894-3.
During the period from 1945 to the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the least understood factors in the war on the eastern front was the Red Army. Almost no one wrote about the military force that broke the back of the Wehrmacht, with the exception of one or two western scholars who had been granted some limited access to Soviet archives. During the later stages of the 1980s, more Soviet works appeared, as well as the very fine studies produced by David Glantz. Now Walter Dunn has weighed in with Hitler's Nemesis, and the results are very worthwhile.
The book is essentially a study of the Red Army as an organization. Through a careful survey of German Army intelligence documents on Soviet organization as well as examining a number of recent Russian works, Dunn has been able to fill some important gaps in our knowledge. Dunn deals with matters such as organization, training and the personnel system of the Red Army.
The book has its problems as well, of course. The prime of these is the writing style. Dunn prose is so terse that it lends new meaning to the word choppy. He also would have done well to have included a series of appendices dealing with the separate organizations, especially the armored units.
These flaws (including the typically stiff Greenwood price) notwithstanding, Dunn has made a fine contribution. This book will become a standard reference source for anyone interested in the eastern front.
Return to Bull Run, by John J. Hennessy New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. 607 pp. Maps, illus, bibliog., index. $29.95.
This splendid book is the best study we have yet of the Second Manassas campaign, in many ways Robert E. Lee s greatest achievement as a military commander. It covers the period immediately after Cedar Mountain (9 August 1862) and goes up to the restoration of George McClellan to the command of the Army of the Potomac in September.
Hennessy has presented us with a superbly researched, well written study. His analysis of Lee s plan for the campaign, Popes reaction to Lee's attempts to get around Pope s flank, and the conduct of the battle on both sides is brilliant. Hennessy also gives very perceptive assessments of the subordinate commanders involved, most notably Stonewall Jackson and James Longstreet. Taken all together, this is a terrific book.
To the Gates of Richmond, by Stephen W. Sears New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1992. 468 pp. Illus, maps, bibliog, index. $24.95.
For a long time, we have needed a good book on the Peninsula Campaign. That need has now been satisfied by Stephen Sears. To the Gates of Richmond is the kind of quality stuff we have become accustomed to seeing from Sears.
The book begins with the initial conception of the campaign in March 1862 and goes up to the battle of Malvern Hill. Sears does his usual thorough job in researching the campaign, and presenting it in his customary well-written style. Not only does Sears go into the traditional stuff, but also deals with matters often unnoticed in Civil War books. For example, he looks into staff work in some detail, and demonstrates how poor staff work had a deleterious effect on operations, especially in the Army of Northern Virginia. The one relatively predictable aspect of the book is Sears opinion of George B. McClellan. Sears has made something of a career of McClellan bashing, and after three books it does become a bit tiresome. Nonetheless, this book is well-done. Taken together with Robert Kricks Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain and John J. Hennessy s Return to Bull Run, the student of the Civil War can get as complete a coverage of the war in the east in the spring and summer of 1862 as possible.
Storm Over Iraq by Richard P. Hallion. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1992. 383 pp. Illus, maps, bibliog., index. $22.95.
This is a very fine study of the Air Force's role in the Gulf War. Hellion starts off with a good survey of the U.S. Air Forces history from the creation of the Army Air Force up through the defense build-up in the Reagan era. The author is especially good in dealing with complicated technical issues, particularly in the thorny area or procurement of new aircraft.
Hallion then goes into an extended study of the Air Force in the Gulf. While this is good in the sense that it brings to light a number of otherwise unknown number of things, in particular the role of Col. John Warden III in planning the air campaign, the flaws in the book emerge. The basic problem here is that Hallion is a strong backer of the Air Force "party line," namely, how the USAF won the war all by itself. When it comes to the role played by the Army, Navy and Marine Corps, Hallion tends to "damn with faint praise." He tends to agree completely with the judgments of USAF bomb damage assessors in regard to the effectiveness of Air Force bombing missions, certainly an assertion that is being contested now.
These flaws and the author's bias notwithstanding, the book is certainly worth a read. As long as you can wade past the Douhetian nonsense, Hallion has an excellent grasp of the issues and can write about them cogently.
The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada, 1481-1492 by William H. Prescott, edited and with New Material by Albert D. McJoynt. London/Mechanicburg, PA: Greenhill/Stackpole, 1995. 288 pp. Illus, maps, charts, commentary, glossary, notes, bibliog., index. No price given. ISBN: 1-85367-193-2.
William H. Prescotts histories of Spain and the Spanish Empire in the their golden age have stood the test of time well. Indeed, in the course of editing the military portions of The Conquest of Granada McJoynt discovered that Prescott had worked so carefully, that there was little that newly discovered materials could add to his narrative and conclusions. So why this book?
The Art of War in Spain is a new-old work.
McJoynt has lightly revised the military portions of Prescotts work --now some 150 years old-- in those few instances where newly discovered materials have altered the facts or conclusions. He has also added an extensive examination of the practical aspects on of war in the period, including fortification, organization, strategy, and finance, to which he has added a an extensive commentary on Prescotts philosophy of history, his scholarship, his style, and his critics.
As a result, McJoynts edition of Prescotts work is more than just an account of the war for Granada, it is also an invaluable a guide to the conduct of war in the late fifteenth century.
New and Noteworthy
G.I. Victory: The U.S. Army in World War II Color by Jeffrey L. Ethell and David C. Isby. London/Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill/ Stackpole, 1995. 160 pp. Illus. No price given. ISBN: 1-85367-200-9
Contains numerous and rare color images for the U.S. Army from 1940 through 1945, with extensive commentary on uniforms and equipment.
Hitlers Options: Alternate Decisions of World War II edited by Kenneth Macksey. London/Mechanicsburg, PA: Greenhill/ Stackpole, 1995. 224 pp. Illus, maps, bibliog, index. No price given. ISBN: 1-85367-192-4.
The "what ifs" of World War II, a series of essays the possible effects if German strategic decisions had been different in ten instances, ranging from going ahead with Operation Sea Lion to committing the panzers early on D-Day. Well done, and providing much food for thought.
The Souths Finest: The First Missouri Confederate Brigade from Pea Ridge to Vicksburg by Philip Thomas Tucker. Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1993. xxvi, 271 pp. Illus, maps, notes, bibliog, index. $27.95. ISBN: 0-942597-31-1.
Over the last dozen years the White Mane Publishing Company has established itself as one of the best small houses dealing with military history, publishing a series of excellent books on important, but often obscure subjects. The Souths Finest continues this tradition, dealing with a notable unit from the Trans-Mississippi Theater that fought until captured at Vicksburg.
The Fall of the Asante Empire: The Hundred-Year War for Africas Gold Coast, by Robert B. Edgerton. New York: The Free Press, 1995. x, 293 pp. Illus, maps, notes, bibliog, index. $23.00. ISBN: 0-02-908926-3.
A general treatment of the several Anglo-Asante Wars from Napoleonic times to 1900. The strength of the book is in its examination of the relationship between society, politics, and the military establishment in the Asante nation. There are some good battle pieces, and a wealth of interesting detail.
To the Point: The United States Military Academy, 1802-1902 by George S. Pappas. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993. xxi, 528 pp. Illus, maps, append, bibliog, index. $55.00 ISBN: 0-275-94329-1.
The history of the military academy from the first tentative proposals, in the generation that preceeded its founding, to the beginning of the twentieth century. Not only does the book provide a look at the life of the cadets, but also at the development of the curriculum, the introduction of innovative teaching techniques that were to profoundly influence American education (such as blackboards!), the politics of the academy, and the numerous interesting people who passed through it.
General John Buford: A Military Biography, by Edward Longacre. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1995. 312 pp. Maps, notes, bibliog, index. ISBN: 0-93829-46-2. $24.95.
This is the first biography of John Buford, the Union cavalryman whose stand before Gettysburg on the first day of the battle is familiar to most people --even Civil War buffs-- primarily as a result of Sam Elliots portrayal of him in the film Gettysburg. A superb cavalryman, Buford, a southerner who remained loyal to his oath, died of disease not long after Gettysburg, which caused him to drop from the publics eye. As he left no private papers or letters, no one attempted to do a biography until Ed Longacre, author of The Cavalry at Gettusburg, thought to look at the vast amount of paperwork in which the general appears, official orders, letters, reports, and the like. The result, while not quite a genuine biography, is nevertheless a valuable contribution to the literature of the Civil War.
The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 by Mark C. Bartusis. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1992. xvii, 438pp. Maps, illus, tables, notes, append., bibl., index. $46.95. ISBN: 0-8122-3179-1.
A well-written, extremely good look at the social and administrative background of the Byzantine Army in its last two centuries, sadly flawed by a lack of attention to equipment, tactics, and strategy, with only a cursory look at operations. This is unfortunate, but considering the scope of the work --and its high quality-- understandable. Likely to be of value to the Byzantine specialist, or anyone interested in medieval warfare.
President Lincoln's Third Largest City: Brooklyn & the Civil War by E.A. Livingston. New York: Budd Press, 1993. 188 pp. Notes, bibliog., index. $19.95. ISBN: 0-9638-981-0-8. (71-16 66th St., Glendale, N.Y., 11385).
A terrific look at the history and role of Brooklyn in the war, from a specialist. Bud Livingston manages to cover daily life, military events, industry, personages, and much else beside. Useful for the Civil War specialist and buff alike, as well as for anyone interested in the history of one of America's most distinctive cities.
Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Chronology and Fact Book by Kevin Don Hutchison. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1995. xvii, 267 pp. Illus, maps, tables, append., bibliog., index. $69.00. ISBN: 0-313-29606-5
A mountain of information supplementing an extensive chronology of the events from mid-1990 through mid-1991, well organized, detailed, and generally very accurate.
A must for those interested in the Gulf War.
Grants Canal: The Unions Attempt to Bypass Vicksburg by David F. Bastian, Shippensburg, PA: White Mane, 1996. 82 pp. Illus, maps, notes, bibliog. $6.95. ISBN: 0-942597-93-1.
A wonderfully interesting treatment of Grants costly and abortive attempt to dig a canal that would divert the Mississippi from Vicksburg, thereby rendering the Confederate bastion useless. Although short, the work manages to deal with a variety of issues, including the strategic situation and the technical difficulties of digging the canal.
Recent Books on 1898
The approach of the hundredth anniversary of the Spanish-American War has led to a revival of interest in the nations shortest, and perhaps least understood major conflict. The number of books to appear in the last year or two has been impressive, and they have generally been of excellent quality.
The Spanish-American War at Sea: Naval Action in the Atlantic by A.B. Feuer. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995. xiv, 225 pp. Illus, maps, append, bibliog., index. No price given. ISBN: 0-275-95106-5.
A good survey of the naval side of the 1898 war in the Atlantic, using many first hand accounts. Worth reading for anyone unfamiliar with this aspect of the Spanish-American War.
The Santiago Campaign of 1898: A Soldier's View of the Spanish-American War by A.B. Feuer. Westport, CT.: Praeger, 1993. xvi, 147 pp. Illus, maps, bibl., index. $47.95. ISBN: 0-275-94479-4.
By piecing together excerpts from the diaries and memoirs of veterans of the campaign, the author has created a very valuable look at the war from the perspective of the common soldier, flawed only by a lack of critical commentary (as in the several times repeated tale of bully beef "left over from the Civil War."). Amusing to read, and often very informative.
Crucible of Empire: The Spanish-American War & Its Aftermath, edited by James C. Bradford. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1993. xxii, 269pp. Illus, maps, append., notes, index. $31.95. ISBN: 1-55750-079-7.
An excellent collection of essays on the 1898 war and the Philippine Question, ranging over such diverse topics as intelligence, combined operations, General Shafter, and Marine Corps operations, with the best dealing with the fighting on Samar, probably the clearest treatment yet of that controversial operation.
The U.S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-1902 by Brian McAllister Linn. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1989. xviii, 258 pp. Maps, notes, bibliog., index. No price give. ISBN: 0-8078-1834-8.
An excellent overview of the controversial "Philippine Insurrection," with more than the customary look at the other side. Interesting not only for its treatment of the war in the Philippines, but also because of the ways in which, two generations later, the Army would largely ignore the lessons learned in the Philippines.
Crossing the Deadly Ground: United States Army Tactics, 1865-1899, by Perry D. Jamieson. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama, 1994. xiv, 230 pp. Illus, notes, bibliog, index. $29.95. ISBN: 0-8173-0760-5.
An unsatisfactory look at the development of American infantry tactics in the final third of the nineteenth century. The problem is that there rather than presenting a coherent overview of the general trend in tactical thought the book tends to present a series of snapshots of the thinking at particular moments.
The Marine Corps Search for a Mission: 1880-1898, by Jack Shulimson. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas, 1993. xiii, 274 pp. Illus, notes, bibliog., index. No price given. ISBN: 0-7006-0608-4.
An excellent overview of the development of the Marine Corps in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. It goes beyond the promise of the title, to examine not only the development of the Corps role in the military establishment, but also problems of interservice rivalry, professionalism, organization, recruiting, and equipment, concluding with a good look at Marine operations in Cuba in 1898.
NYMAS Membership Notes
Dr. Richard L. DiNardo, NYMAS Treasurer, will be returning to St. Peters College, New Jersey, after completing his second and final year as Visiting Professor of Military History at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery. Alabama.
Board member Steve Zaloga, who serves as an adjunct staff member with the Institute for Defense Analyses, recently completed work on a U.S. Marine Corps project, preparing a handbook on heavy weapons likely to be encountered in regional conflicts. His two-year study on international defense budgets and arms exports for the Tcal Group Corporation is to be published in March 1996. Recent books include an Osprey Campaign Series book on Operation Bagration: The Destruction of Army Group Center, 1944 and two books in the Osprey New Vanguard series, on the M2 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle and on the KV Heavy Tanks. He is current working on two photo books for Concord Publications on armor battles of the Mid-East Wars.
Acting Treasurer and board member Dr. Kathleen Williams has been awarded a grant from the CUNY Womens Research and Development Fund for a project on "Women Ashore: Contributions of American Women (Civilian and Military) to the Development of Naval Technology in World War II." Her book, Secret Weapon: U.S. High Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic is to be published shortly by the Naval Institute Press.
The 98 Campaign: The Spanish-American War, by Secretary Dr. Albert A. Nofi, is to be published later this year by Combined Books. He is currently working on The Pacific War Encyclopedia, with member James F. Dunnigan, which will be published early next year by Facts-on-File. Their Dirty Little Secrets of World War II (New York: Morrow, 1994) has just been published in Japan.
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