The NYMAS Newsletter

Winter 1997

~~~~~~~~~~

A Publication of

The New York Military Affairs Symposium

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

 

1997 NYMAS Conference

"New Perspectives on the Great War"

 

Scheduled to coincide with the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, the NYMAS annual military history conference will be held on Saturday, 4 January 1997. Co-sponsored by the Society for Military History, the Conference will be held at the Williams Club, 24 East 39th Street in Manhattan.

Scheduled presentations are:

 

~~~~~~

Feature Review

 

Secret Weapon

by

Kathleen Broome Williams

 

Although the story of the role of technology in the defeat of German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic has often been told, the role of HF-DF (Huff-Duff) has usually been slighted. The German Navy's high command relied on radio for control of its U-boat force during the Battle of the Atlantic. The Germans were well aware of the vulnerabilities of radio communication in land warfare, but they failed to appreciate their corresponding naval vulnerabilities. Most World War II armies used radio triangulation to determine the location of enemy radio broadcasts. This was straightforward, since armies were often within line-of-sight of one another. However, at sea, the distances were enormous, ships were constantly moving, and direction finding based on enemy transmissions was a much more serious technological challenge. The Germans did not have great success in this endeavor, and so tended to discount the possibility that the Allies would succeed. This arrogance proved to be one of the an Achilles heel for the U-boats. Indeed, for many years, writers on the U-boat war have tended to reflect the German view that it was radar, aircraft and other innovations which doomed the U-boat. As Kathy Williams so clearly lays out in this ground-breaking new study, HF-DF was one of the critical technologies that spelled an end to German submarine success in the Atlantic. While Ultra decrypts exploited the actual information content of German radio transmissions, Huff Duff helped Navy ships and ASW aircraft in the tactical arena to pinpoint their location.

Secret Weapon begins by providing a useful overview to the operational and technical issues involved in the war in the Atlantic. The role of radio in the control of the Uboats is explained in some detail, and then attention turns to a variety of critical new technologies aimed at stopping the U-boat scourge including sonar, radar and the Ultra decrypts. Britain had some limited success with strategic, land-based direction-finding in World War I, but peacetime budgets did not permit a full exploitation of this technology until the war broke out. The Royal Navy's early successes with tactical HF-DF in the first years of the war piqued US interest. It was actually a French engineer of a US subsidiary, ITT-Paris, who developed several key innovations. Ironically, his efforts almost became derailed by US concerns over ITT's security clearances. But the US Naval Research Lab pressed ahead in cooperation with the ITT engineers, finally fielding the improved systems by 1943.

Kathy Williams succeeds in telling this complicated tale by means of a through examination of the wide range of players in the decisions to proceed with Huff-Duff. While many histories of military technology concentrate on a single organization such as the military customer, or the developing company, Secret Weapon covers the complex interplay between the inventors, their corporate management, the Navy's own research labs, the senior Navy leadership, and serving Navy officers. This book concludes with descriptions of how Huff-Duff was used against the U-boats, and provides summary data on U-boat sinkings in which Huff-Duff played an important part. Given the complexity of judging the many different factors which assisted the Allies in the war against the U-boat, Kathy Williams provides a sober assessment of the relative importance of Huff-Duff in the overall picture. Secret Weapon is an important new contribution in our understanding of the Battle of the Atlantic, and an archetype of contemporary history of military technology. It is a special pleasure to recommend this splendid book from an active member of NYMAS.

Secret Weapon: U.S. High Frequency Direction Finding in the Battle of the Atlantic, by Kathleen Broome Williams. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996. xix, 289 pp. Illus, tables, diagr, maps, notes, bibliog, index. $$35.00. ISBN: 1-55750- 935-2

-Steven Zaloga

~~~~~~

Quotation from Chairman

Bonaparte

 

"Compromises weaken power."

 

~~~~~~

 

Reviews

 

The Austro-Prussian War: Austria's War With Prussia and Italy in 1866, by Geoffrey Wawro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 313 pp., illus., maps, index, $29.95.

This book fills an important gap in European military history. We have long needed a good book on the Austro-Prussian War to supercede the now rather dated work by Gordon Craig. Wawro's book is a comprehensive history of the war, largely from the Austrian side.

The research for the book is excellent. Aside from going through the published histories of the general staffs involved as well as the published writings of some of the principals, Wawro did extensive research in the Austrian, German, and Italian archives. This enabled him to give a fairly comprehensive look at the war. Of particular value here is his study of the action on the Italian front, a subject often ignored. The coverage of Custoza, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the Italian Army, is very detailed.

Wawro, of course, spends most of his time dealing with the confrontation between Prussia and Austria in Bohemia. While the superiority of the Prussian "needle gun" is given its due, Wawro shows conclusively that Koniggratz was much more of a close run thing than we have often assumed. Rather, the Austrians had a window of opportunity to score a decisive victory, but it was fumbled away by the incompetence of their commander, Feldzagmeister Ludwig Benedek. Wawro's description of chaotic Austrian staff procedures and command difficulties almost beggar the imagination. Likewise, his examination of the Prussian war effort, and Moltke's problems in dealing with his unruly subordinates, can only increase the respect one has for him.

All told, although rather expensive (what academic book isn't these days?), this is a superior work, well worth the time and money.

-R.L. DiNardo

 

General James Longstreet, by Jeffry D. Wert, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1993. 527pp. Illus., maps, index. $25 00.

One of the most controversial figures in Civil War history is James Longstreet. Vilified as "the man who lost Gettysburg" for over a century by "Lost Cause" mythologizers such as Jubal Early and William Pendleton and the historians who succeeded them, there has long been a need to take a second look at his career. The revision of Longstreet’s reputation began with William Carrett Piston’s, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant, which documented the process by which Longstreet went from being Lee’s most able and trusted subordinate to his bete noire. Nevertheless, that work was not a military biography. Now, however, Jeffry Wert has tackled the task, and the results are welcome.

Wert has produced a detailed military biography, which focuses largely on Longstreet’s Civil War career. He depicts Longstreet as a commander who constantly improved during the war, going from a miserable performance at Seven Pines to nearly flawless battles such as Chickamauga and the Wilderness. Longstreet’s service in the Mexican War, particularly his presence at the storming of Churubusco and Chapultepec, convinced him that assaulting fortified positions was in general too expensive an undertaking, hence his penchant for the tactical defensive.

Too be sure, this is no exercise in hagiography. Wert details the dark side of Longstreet s personality. This emeryed particularly in regard to his treatment of Lafayette McLaws in late 1863, which can only be described as petty. Wert's coverage of the Gettyeburg episode is fair. While Longstreet does not escape from blame for the failure of the Confederate attack on 3 July 1863, he is certainly not the scapegoat that so many others have made him out to be.

There are some bones that one can pick with Wert’s work. This is especially true with regard to Longstreet’s desire to go west to serve under Joseph E. Johnston, in what has come to be known among Civil War Historians as the "Western concentration bloc." Wert dates Longstreet’s inclusion in this from 1863, while other students of the war, with more supporting evidence, generally date Longstreet’s desire to go west to 1862. Nonetheless, this is a book we have long needed. Wert’s contention that Longstreet was a better corps commander that Stonewall Jackson will undoubtedly raise the hackles of Jackson’s rather inflated military reputation, but is in the end, I think, well-documented and judicious.

Taken all together this is a valuable contribution to the study of the Civil War. It is well worth the time and money.

 

-R.L. DiNardo

The First Day At Gettysburg, edited by Gary Gallagher. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1992. 174 pp., illus., maps, index. $11.95.

The Second Day at Gettysburg, edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1993. 210pp. Illus., maps, index. $14.95.

Over the last few years, Gary W. Gallagher of Penn State University has run an annual conference on a Civil War battle, and then published the papers in book form. Thus far, the series has covered the 1864 campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, Antietam, the first two days at Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg. A volume on the third day of Gettysburg will be out shortly, to be followed by Chancellorsville and the Wilderness. The core of the series of books are essays by Gallagher, noted Confederate historian Robert K. Krick and Union historian A. Wilson Greene. One or two additional pieces are usually included. The volume dealing with the first day, opens with a piece by Alan T. Nolan which is very critical of Lee s conduct of the campaign, which he argues set the stage for the battle into which the Army of Northern Virginia blundered on 1 July 1863. Gallagher then follows with a thoughtful essay on the debuts of A.P. Hill and Richard S. Ewell as corps commanders. A. Wilson Greene’s essay challenges the traditional view of the performance of Oliver O. Howard and the XI Corps. Finally Robert Krick deals with the failure of Confederate brigade leadership in the Second and Third Corps on July 1.

The volume on the second day begins with an essay by Gallagher dealing with Lee’s thinking on 2 July, is followed by a defense of Dan Sickles’ controversial advance to the Peach Orchard by William Glenn Robertson, one by Robert Krick on Longstreet, Greene on Henry W. Slocum and the XII C'orps, and D. Scott Hartwig on the action fought by John C. Caldwell’s division of the 1I Corps in the Wheatfield.

Of all the essays in the two books, probably the best are Gallagher’s, furthering his already substantial reputation as one of the most perceptive historians of the war. Greene’s piece on the XI Corps on July 1, although spirited and well-argued, was less than convincing, while his piece on the XII Corps, although brilliantly researched and written, seemed to me a bit too long. Krick's work on Confederate brigade command is nicely done, but his conclusion, namely that Lee would have won if Stonewall Jackson had been there, is hackneyed in the extreme. His piece on Longstreet is so blatantly dishonest one would have thought it had been written by Jubal Early himself. As for the additional essays, Nolan’s is thoroughly in keeping with the tone of his controversial Lee Considered. Robertsorn’s defense of Dan Sickles is interesting, but ultimately fails to hold water. Hartwig's article gives the reader an excellent feel for the savage nature of the fighting in the Wheatfield.

Taken all together, these are two very stimulating collections of essays. Despite the unevenness of works such as these, these two books are well worth the time for anyone interested in the Civil War.

 

~~~~~~

 

Tsar Ferdinand Meets Kaiser Bill:

A Case Study in Royal Diplomacy

 

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (1861-1948) was a rather able, if unpleasant character who became Prince of Bulgaria in 1887 through the machinations of European power politics. In 1908 Ferdinand declared Bulgaria independent of the Ottoman Empire and himself "Tsar", or emperor. Ferdinand had many peculiarities. He once procured the purported regalia of a Byzantine Emperor from a theatrical supplier, to towards the day when he would "liberate" Constantinople from the Turks and restore the empire. His assumption of the imperial dignity antagonized a number of people, most notably Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, his ally and protector, and King George I of Greece, who also had his eye on the Byzantine dignity.

Needless to say, Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany had his opinion about Ferdinand as well, as he did about virtually everything in the universe. As far as he was concerned Ferdinand was a fat upstart and a buffoon to boot. As it turned out, the Kaiser's opinion got him trouble, not for the first time.

In 1909 Ferdinand paid a visit to Berlin with the intention of signing an agreement to re-equip the Bulgarian artillery exclusively with Krupp guns. The Kaiser was, of course, obliged to pay him the courtesies due a reigning monarch and thus invited him to a banquet at Potsdam. During the festivities Ferdinand –who was an amateur gardener and ornithologist-- leaned out an open window to admire the garden, with its many beautiful flowers and birds, thus exposing a rather ample bottom. The Kaiser, who generally behaved more like an adolescent than a Hohenzollern, couldn't resist the opportunity, and delivered a sharp smack to Ferdinand's fundament, laughing heartily as he did so. Ferdinand spun around in a rage and demanded an apology. The Kaiser replied that none was in order for a good joke. At that, Ferdinand left the palace and was soon heading for home. Soon after, the French firm of Schneider-Creuzot concluded a deal to supply artillery to the Bulgarian Army.

-A.A. Nofi

 

~~~~~~

The Civil War Bookshelf

 

Perhaps the "Groaning Civil War Bookshelf" might be better name for this column, which appears regularly in The Newsletter, as the flow of works on the great conflict grows ever more plentiful.

 

Brassey’s History of Uniforms: American Civil War Confederate Army by Ron Field. London: Brassey’s, 1996. 144 pp. Illus, bibliog, append, index. £18.95. ISBN: 1-085753-162-0

Brassey’s History of Uniforms: American Civil War Union Army by Robin Smith. London: Brassey’s, 1996. 144 pp. Illus, bibliog, append, index. £18.95. ISBN: 1-85753-174-4.

An unusually valuable pair of books devoted to the uniforms of the Civil War. Although the Confederate volume is somewhat superior to the Union one (devoting separate chapters to each state), both books are well illustrated, concise, and clear. Among the numerous illustrations, mostly period photographs but with some drawings and color plates, are a great many unusual images. As is often the case in such works, there is also a great deal of information weapons, equipment, and order of battle.

 

The Civil War in North Carolina, by John G. Barrett. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1995. xiii, 484pp. Map, illus, notes, bibliog, index. $29.95. ISBN: 0-8078-4520-5.

Originally published in 1962, The Civil War in North Carolina remains a valuable study of military operations within the state, a very overlooked theater of the war. Valuable for the professional student of the Civil War, and the buff as well.

 

The Federicksburg Campaign: Decision on the Rappahannock, edited by Gary W. Gallagher. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1995. xi, 242 pp. Maps, illus, notes, bibliog, index. $24.95. ISBN: 0-8078-2193-4.

A ground breaking collection of essays on the disastrous Union assault at Federicksburg on 13 December 1862. One of the most important essays, William Marvel’s "The Making of a Myth," examines the way in which the entire blame for the defeat was placed on Ambrose Burnside, by several officers who were far more responsible for it than he. Other essays examine the importance of the battle for Confederate morale, its effect on the civilian population, and some operations aspects. A valuable contribution to the literature.

 

Guns for Cotton: England Arms the Confederacy, by Thomas Boaz. Shippensburg, PA: Burd Street Press, 1996. ix, 86pp. Illus, maps, tales, appendix, notes, bibliog., index. $9.95. ISBN: 1-57249-004-7.

A short, bur surprising good and detailed treatment of the Confederacy’s efforts to procure arms in Europe, with particular reference to England.

 

~~~~~~

 

The Medal of Honor in the Spanish-American War

 

The only decoration which existed for members of the U.S. armed forces at the time of the Spanish-American War was the Medal of Honor. Created during the Civil War, the circumstances under which the Medal of Honor --which came in different versions for the Army and the Navy-- could be award were broad. The Navy medal, for which Marines were also eligible, but not members of the Revenue Cutter Service, could be awarded for courageous acts in the face of life threatening danger not only in combat but also including shipboard accidents and rescues at sea, but was limited to enlisted men. The Army medal could be awarded to both officers and enlisted men for distinguished performance of one's duty, usually, but not always, in direct combat. As a result, the Medal of Honor was awarded rather generously.

 

Altogether 109 men were awarded the Medal of Honor for the Spanish-American War.

 

Date Action Awards

1 May Battle of Manila Bay 1

11 May Cable Cutting at Cienfuegos 52

11 May Cardenas Raid 3

21 May Cavite, accident, aboard

USS Concord 3

28 May Santiago, accident, aboard

USS Vixen 2

3 Jun Santiago, scuttling steamer

Merrimac 8

14 Jun Battle of Cuzco Well 2

24 Jun Battle of Las Guasimas 1

30 Jun Tayabacoa Raid 4

30 Jun Manzanillo Raid 1

1 Jul Battle of Santiago:

Storming of San Juan Hill 13

Attack on El Caney 9

2 Jul Skirmish at Santiago 2

3 Jul Naval Battle of Santiago 1

20 Jul Santiago, accident aboard

USS Iowa 2

23 Jul Manimani Raid 1

26-27 Jul Caimanera Raid 4

 

Every enlisted man who took part in the cable cutting raid at Cienfuegos and in the attempt to scuttle the collier Merrimac at Santiago received the Navy Medal of Honor, but the officer who commanded the Merrimac’s crew did not receive his until over 30 years later. On the other hand, only three of the men involved in the action at Cardenas received a Medal of Honor, all Navy men or Marines. This was because the Navy Medal of Honor could not be awarded to members of the Revenue Cutter Service. As a result, on 3 May 1900 Congress authorized a large (3.125-inches to be precise) plaque for each of the men involved. The "Cardenas Medal of Honor," came in three grades, gold for the commander of the USRC Hudson, silver for his officers, and bronze for his enlisted men.

Ten of the Medals of Honor went to black soldiers, all of the 10th cavalry, four for the action at Tayabacoa, during which a party of Company H engaged in landing supplies for the Cuban insurgents was ambushed by Spanish troops, and the balance for San Juan Hill.

Only eight of the Medals of Honor went to officers, and one of these not until 1933, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt awarded one to Rear Admiral Richmond Pearson Hobson for the Merrimack affair. This was because in the Army the normal reward for officers performing distingished service was a brevet --honorary-- promotion, while Navy and Marine officers were not eligible for the Medal of Honor until 1916. Thus, in lieu of decorations, 10 Marine officers were breveted for the fighting at Guantanamo and the Battle fo Cuzco Well, and one for the Naval Battle of Santiago.

Most of the awards to soldiers were made for rescuing the wounded under fire. None of the awards was posthumous.

 

~~~~~~

 

Short Rounds

Brief Reviews of Recent Military Books

The Pattons: A Personal History of an American Family by Robert H. Patton. Washington & London: Brassey’s, 1994. xv, 320 pp. Illus, notes, index. $24.95. ISBN: 1-57488-127-2.

An extremely personal, and frequently insightful, history of the Patton family. Although the particular emphasis is, of course, on Gen. George Smith Patton III, whom the author –the general’s grandson—refers to as "Georgie," there is extensive interesting material on the family going back before the first Patton (the name descending from a rather shadowy fellow who arrived in the colonies in the mid-eighteenth century), and right on into the author’s own generation. Drawing upon family records and personal recollections as well as official documents, the book is a valuable contribution to the literature on General Patton, on life in the U.S. Army in the first half of this century, and on World War II.

 

Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit by Tom Clancy. New York: Berkley Books, 1996. xv, 336pp. Illus, plans, diagr, maps, tables, bibliog, index. $16.00. ISBN: 0-425-15454-8

Yet another in Clancy’s successful "Guided Tour" series (already published are Submarine, Armored Cav, and Fighter Wing), Marine differes somewhat from the previous

volumes in the series by including an introductory section "Marine—Part of the American Soul" and more historical background. The book gives a good picture of the nature of the Marine Corps, and particularly of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), covering personnel, organization, equipment, and missions. It includes two short fictional looks at how an MEU mission might arise, be mounted, and unfold, albeit that things go rather better than they are likely to do in an actual operation.

 

The Marine Book: A Portrait of America’s Military Elite by Chuck Lawliss. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1992. 205pp. Illus, tables, append, bibliog. $19.95. ISBN: 0-500-27665-X

An interesting look at the Marine Corps, less technical than the above reviewed work by Clancy, but with more historical background, mini-biographies of some notable Marines, and a better perspective on organizational and instutional matters, plus a valuable appendix.

 

The History of the War in Texas by Vicente Filisola, translated by Wallace Woolsey. Austin: Eakin Press, 1985. xxxvii, 226 pp. Illus, index. $16.95. ISBN: 1-57-168-034-9.

Filisola, second-in-command to Santa Anna during the Texas Campaign of 1836, penned two volumes of memoirs about the war which were published in 1848. An invaluable source of information about the campaign, the book was not available in English until this edition. Although abridged –omitting considerable technical and redundant materials, the book has a useful short biography of the general by the translator.

 

Alamo Defenders: A Genealogy, the People and their Words, by Bill Groneman. Austin: Eakin Press, 1990. xiv, 185+ pp. Illus, diagr, notes, bibliog. No price indicated. ISBN: 0-89015-757-X

A compilation of short biographies, with references, of all persons known to have been in the Alamo during the historic 13 days of 1836, including not merely the defenders, but also several of the women and children who were present,. There is a useful introductory essay concerning the numbers of those killed, a thorny historical problem. A valuable book, marred only by the author’s insistence that persons holding that Davy Crockett as among the five men captured and later murdered are driven by ulterior motives.

 

Emperors and Gladiators, by Thomas Wiedemann. New York: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1995. xvii, 198 pp. Illus, maps, glossary, notes, bibliog, index. No price given. ISBN: 0-415-0005-X.

Albeit not military history, an interesting, and very useful look at the "games" which came to dominate popular culture during the Roman Empire, with several valuable new insights and interpretations.

 

The Ultra-Magic Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946, by Bradley F. Smith. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993. xii, 276 pp. Notes, index. $24.95. ISBN: 0-9141-483-5.

Examines the exchange of super secret information between the United States and Britain during World War II, from its tentative beginnings in 1940 to the almost complete openness which existed by the end of the war. The work includes some valuable observations. It is likely to be of particular use to those interested in intelligence and grand strategy.

 

~~~~~~

 

New References of Note

 

Biographical Dictionary of the Union: Northern Leaders of the Civil War, edited by Johns T. Hubbell and James W. Geary. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995. x, 173+ pp. Bibliog., index. $99.50. ISBN: 0-313-20920-0.

A useful volume, with a few flaws. While all the major players, civil and military are included, there are also a number of obscure editors and members of Congress to be found in the book, as well as some women and African-Americans whose contribution to the war effort can hardly be said to have been equal to that of the heroic Cushing brothers or both wartime commandants of the Marine Corps, none of whom are included.

 

U.S. Merchant Vessel War Casualties of World War II, by Robert M. Browning, Jr. Annapolis: Naval Institute, 1996. xxii, 575 pp. Glossary, appendix, bibliog, index. $49.95. ISBN: 1-55750-087-8.

A useful handbook for anyone interested in the wartime merchant marine, the Battle of the Atlantic, or the logistical aspects of World War II. Because the book is limited to privately owned vessels, it omits treatment of cargo ships, tankers, and the like owned and operated by the Army and Navy. In addition, it tends not to include sometimes valuable anecdotal information on the lost vessels, such as the fact that the SS Frederick Douglass had a black skipper, who was heartily disliked by several of the white officers and crewmen, including the chief engineer, a matter which seems to have played a role in the ship’s loss.

 

The Reader’s Companion to Military History, edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. Boston: Hughton Mifflin, 1996. xvi, 573pp. Illus, maps, tables, index. $45.00. ISBN: 0-395-66969-3.

Although with contributions from the likes of Donald Kagan, Thomas Fleming, and Carol D’Este) many of the individual entries in this encyclopedic reference are of very high quality, overall the work is not very good. Essentially it seems to be a hodge-podge of articles, all individually good, but together not quite making a whole. Omissions are interesting, so that while there is an entry for Camperdown, there are none for the far more important Adrianople or Alesia, and while there are entries for a host of mid-level German commanders and lots of obscure Asian ones, there are none for Galibaldi, nor any of Napoleon’s marshals, while the inclusion of an politically correct entry on "Blacks in the Military," hardly makes up for the omission of Shaka, Samori Toure, or Menelik. Some excellent pieces on things like mobilization, technological innovation, and peacekeeping, as well as some amusing –if debatably accurate lists ("The Ten Worst Generals of All Time" ) barely redeem the book’s many failures.

 

Some Civil War Trivia

 

 

~~~~~~

 

NYMAS Membership Notes

 

Board menber Valerie Eads has won a CUNY Distinguished Scholar Fellowship, the Helaine Newsted Bequest Award ($10,000) for her dissertation, "Mighty in War: Matilda of Tuscany, the Investiture Controversy, and Military History." On 28 February she will be chairing a panel on Moving Medieval Armies" for the annual conference of the Medieval Club of New York.

Treasurer Dr. Richard L. DiNardo’s article "The Dysfunctional Coalition: The Axis Powers and the Eastern Front in World War II" appeared in The Journal of Military History for October 1966 (Vol. 60, No. 4). His "German Armor Doctrine: Correcting the Myths," was published in the November 1996 issue of War in History

The Pacific War Encyclopedia, by member James F. Dunnigan and Secretary Dr. Albert A. Nofi, will be out in 1997 from Facts-on-File. Dr. Nofi’s The 1898 Campaign will be published shortly. He is currently working on The Marine Corps Book of Lists. On 2 January he is to deliver a lecture before the North Shore Civil War Round Table, in Huntington, on "The Civil War Presidents." Mr. Dunnigan is currently working on Way of the Warrior: The Winning Management Techniques of the Great Military Commanders, with Dan Masterson.

 

~~~~~~

 

Upcoming Events

 

2 Jan: North Shore Civil War Roundtable lecture, Albert A. Nofi, "The Civil War Veteran Presidents."

31 Jan: NYMAS lecture, Tom Wisker, "PatWing 10 in the Philippines & Java, 1941-1942"

14 Feb: NYMAS lecture, Richard Van Nort, "Arms & Armor in Early Medieval Britain"

20 Feb: Medieval Club of New York Conference, "The Medieval World in Motion," will include a panel discussion on "Moving Medieval Armies."

21 Feb: NYMAS lecture, Dodge Billingsly, "The Wars on Russia’s Borders, 1991-1996"

4 Apr: NYMAS Lecture, James Corum, "Airpower in the Spanish Civil War."

18 Apr: NYMAS Lecture, James Dingman, "New Perspectives on Paschendael"

2 May: NYMAS lecture, Paul Walsh, "Braveheart: Fact of Fiction?"

 

In Memoriam

 

Arthur Goodzeit, a veteran NYMAS supporter passed away in December after a long illness. A relaxed, thoughtful fellow, Arthur published the first issues of the NYMAS Newsletter and was for many years an active member of the board. Several NYMAS members attended a memorial service for Arthur on 19 December.

Return to the New York Military Affairs Symposium home page