Feature Review


Accounts of the war in North Africa invariably focus on British and German leaders and forces, largely ignoring, when they are not denigrating, the Italian role in the campaign. This work is a fairly successful effort to provide a balanced account, giving Italian troops in North Africa, and particularly Italian armored forces, their proper credit.

Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts is by no means an attempt to paper over the problems the Italian Army had in North Africa. It begins with a concise, but excellent discussion of the political, command, strategic, and military weaknesses that plagued Italy going into the war. There follows a brief history of the origins of Italy’s struggle to mechanize its forces, including a look at early operational experience in Ethiopia and Spain that was often quite successful, but generally ignored or viewed through a veil of hostile propaganda. There follows a very good analysis of the Italian disaster in the Western Desert in the opening months of the war in Africa. Then the reader is treated to a series of chapters that cover the role of Italian armored forces in the following series of campaigns, which point out that much of the success attributed to German forces and Erwin Rommel, was at least partially, often primarily, accomplished by Italian troops, including the much-maligned “leg” infantry.

While there’s no effort to conceal failures by Italian forces, much is done to correct any impression that all of the fighting was done by the Germans. Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts is an essential read for anyone with an interest in North Africa

Review


Mary Beard, perhaps the most noted British classicist today, opens The Roman Triumph by pointing out that we actually don’t know very much about the famous Roman ritual parade through the streets of the Eternal City to honor a conquering commander. She then goes on to prove it. For example, historians have held that a triumph always involved the ritual execution of the defeated enemy commander. Yet, Beard notes we have actual evidence of only a handful of such executions, while there are almost as many instances in which we are told the enemy commander was just rusticated. There is no information at all about what happened in most triumphs.

Beard goes on in this fashion from the earliest recorded triumph, of Romulus at the time of the founding of the city, to the last, of Belisarius, a dozen centuries later, ranging back and forth across the ages to examine what is known or can be surmised about the 300-some triumphs (all but about two dozen before the Christian era). In the process, she makes the case that the ritual was not predictable as is often assumed, and that it varied from time to time, due to circumstances or to the tastes of the commander being honored.

There’s a lot more, including the religious aspects, questions about the route through the city, art as a part of the observances, and, of course, the purpose of it all. An excellent work for both the serious student of Roman history and anyone with an interest in the subject.

Without a doubt, the most comprehensive reference on the subject yet seen. Rather than focus narrowly on the military campaigns to recover the Holy Land for Christendom, this work includes the many different undertakings that can be considered “crusades” declared by the Church in the medieval period. These cover, not only campaigns against Islamic control of the Holy Land, but operations to recover other areas from Moslem rule, though the book is curiously weak on southern Italy in the ninth and tenth centuries. It also covers crusades against pagans in northern and eastern Europe, and against heretics and political enemies of the Church. The work is organized thematically, opening with a detailed chronology, followed by narrative profiles of individual Crusades, the principal characters, on all sides, the theory and practice of Crusading, as well as an extensive look at the historiography of the Crusades.


A serious look at the role of Indian allies in the “Spanish Conquest” of what are today Mexico and Central America. The work opens with a thoughtful introduction to what the editors call the “genre” of “Conquest Studies,” in which they point out that different scholars have sought to minimize the role of indigenous forces in the conquest for different reasons. Neither Spanish scholars, seeking to justify Madrid’s dominion over the conquered peoples, nor post-colonial anti-Spanish scholars, seeking to assert a nativist nationalism, could give the Indians who often formed the backbone of “Spanish” armies during the conquest, credit without thereby negating their own arguments. Nine essays follow on a wide variety of topics, touching upon such diverse subjects as the role of Indian wives or mistresses in the conquest (and how time and class could alter their status), the use of Indian troops far from the Americas, as, for example, in the Philippines, or the “Hispanicization” of some members of the native nobility, to name but a few. In the process, the reader is treated to often surprisingly detailed accounts of some of the lesser known campaigns in the region. An excellent work, Indigenous Allies is for the serious student of the Conquest.

Medieval to Early Modern


In their introduction the editors note that histories of amphibious warfare often begin with William the Conqueror or Julius Caesar, descending on Britain, and then skips the centuries to the eighteenth, to Quebec, before going on to spend most of their time in the twentieth. This method omits a lot of history. The editors provide ten essays by various specialists on various approaches to amphibious operations from the Norman Conquest through the seventeenth century. The theaters involved range from the Baltic, right around the European littoral in the Mediterranean, and as far as the Indian Ocean and the Americas, and include riverine and lacustrine operations as well as landings from the sea. While one could quibble over the choice of subject matter (the Baltic, for example, gets two essays, while Turkish and Arab razziadas in the Mediterranean get none), this is an immensely important contribution to the literature of amphibious warfare.


A surprisingly effective attempt to use political science theories of international relations to help explain the rise of Rome. By building upon recent trends in historiography that show, rather persuasively, the Romans to be no more under-handed, ambitious, expansionistic, or militaristic, than any of the other states in their age, Prof. Eckstein demonstrates that the Mediterranean milieu in which the Romans operated during the Republic was essentially a “multipolar anarchy” on a scale unrivaled in more recent ages. He then argues that the success of the Romans in rising to supremacy in this environment, a feat accomplished in Polybius’ famous 50 years from the Hannibalic War to the mid-second century, was due to their ability to coordinate a growing network of allies, and integrate some of them into the fabric of the Roman state itself, even citing cases in which the sons of men prominent in the ranks of Rome’s enemies find themselves sitting in the Senate or even holding the consul-ship. There’s much more, including a good deal of background history on the Greek and Hellenistic ages, a look at Rome’s numerous enemies, and so forth. A valuable read for anyone with an interest in Rome, the ancient world, or international affairs.

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Bayonets for Hire is a logical supplement to William Urban’s earlier Medieval Mercenaries: The Business of War (2006), carrying the story of hired troops in European warfare to the end of the ancien régime. Urban’s premise is that in the early modern period, mercenaries were in effect standing armies, able to stay on “active duty” at a time when most states could not normally afford standing forces, and that they provided a mark of professionalism against which infant national armies emerging across Europe in this period could measured. There’s more, of course, including a lot of fighting, as the role of mercenaries dwindles over time, until the institution of the mass army by the French Revolution. Unlike many other survey works, Bayonets for Hire goes beyond the “core” area of European society, Britain-France-Germany, and covers Europe, the Balkans, Scandinavia, and Spain, though oddly neglecting Italy. The work also has an interesting chapter on mercs and literature, and is of particular interest to students of European warfare.

World War II: ETO


In the first decades following World War I, the reputation of the AEF largely reflected wartime impressions of a well-led, if improvised force that did quite well in combat, due largely to John J. Pershing’s insistence on training it for “open field fighting.” About 25 years ago, quite the opposite picture began to emerge, with some historians arguing that the AEF was an inept, poorly-trained, and ill-led force that spurned the “lessons” learned by the British and French and in consequence incurred excessive casualties. Of late, a new school has emerged, and Prof. Grotelueschen, who teaches at the Air Force Academy, is one of a number of recent historians who takes a less extreme view.

The AEF Way of War, describes the training and performance of four divisions, the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 77th. Although the first pair were “Regulars” (among them a brigade of Marines), the third “National Guardsmen,” and the last “Draftees,” the personnel of all three were quite similar, mostly new recruits or short-timers.

Grotelueschen looks into their training, which was often absent, whether for “trench” or “open field” operations, made worse by the fact that Army doctrine relied on obsolete rifle tactics. But he also looks at how each division adopted itself to the grim realities of the Western Front, often with only lip-service to official doctrine, so that they developed a new, uniquely American approach, that even Jack Pershing might not have recognized. A valuable look at the Doughboys.


This work challenges the long-held notion that the Ottoman Army was an ineptly led, poorly organized force, its victories usually the result of Allied errors and German advisors. And it makes an excellent case, beginning with a look at the Turkish response to the disastrous outcome of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). Prof. Erickson points out that this sparked a thorough reform of the army’s organization, training, and leadership, and also provided the Turks with a cadre of veterans at all levels, something lacking in the ranks of the largely Commonwealth forces that would soon oppose them. The German military mission is examined, and essentially dismissed. Despite getting most of the credit for Ottoman success, German advisors actually began arriving much too late to influence the Turkish army before the empire entered the war, were never available in consequential numbers, and often offered advice that Turkish officers knew was poor. The author examines Ottoman performance in four campaigns, two without (Gallipoli and Kut-al-Amara), and two with (Gaza-Beersheba and Megiddo) German advisors. By making extensive use of Turkish archives, hitherto overlooked or unavailable, the book makes an excellent case that the Ottoman Army was a far more capable force than has generally been assumed.


Few officers can be said to have borne more responsibility for what the author terms “the Apocalypse” than Conrad von Hötzendorf. He was chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff for nearly a decade until 1917, (the midst of World War I), and a notable “hawk” with regard to imperial policy toward Serbia, Russia, and even Italy, one of his own allies. Of course, this is not a revelation, since most historians have taken a similar view. What is new in this work is the deep look into Conrad’s life, examining the people, events, and experiences that shaped his political and strategic views, and his personal growth as an officer, as well as his influence on the conduct of the war. Of particular value is Conrad’s role as a reformer in what was perhaps the most complex army of the age, a subject not
generally addressed in earlier biographies. An important look at one of the major influences of the twentieth century

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World War II: ETO


A remarkably comprehensive, very well illustrated, examination of quite literally all the places in which Hitler either lived or worked from shortly before World War I until his death. Coverage extends even to the army hospitals in which the wounded Hitler was treated during the Great War and his private train. But the book is more than just an illustrated catalog of places in Hitler’s life. The author provides considerable detail on how various places fitted Hitler’s life style and work habits, the business that was conducted in different places, visitors, and so forth. And we also learn what happened to many of these places. This makes the book of value not only to “military buffs” but also to serious historians, since it provides an enormous amount of information on Hitler’s location and actions at important moments in his career.


Stanley G. Payne, the leading American authority on modern Spain, and among the most even-handed students of the subject, presents a very detailed, careful analysis of the relations between the Spanish Caudillo and the German Fuhrer during World War II. The work is divided into three parts. About a fifth of the book deals with the period from the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War to that of World War II, the second part covers the period of Spanish “non-belligerence,” during which Franco tilted strongly toward the Axis, and the third, also about a fifth of the text, covers his disengagement from Axis ties. Although often criticized as being sympathetic to the Spanish Right, Payne clearly holds little affection for Franco, pointing out his prejudices, blunders, and opportunism. The work covers Spain’s military, diplomatic, and economic relations with Germany and, to a lesser extent, Italy, as well as war planning by both sides, the internal politics of the Franco regime, and Franco’s curious but generally positive actions during the Holocaust. Payne also has many interesting word-portraits of people prominent in these events. An important read for anyone interested in the diplomatic and strategic aspects of the war or in Spanish history and politics.


This is second volume of Rick Atkinson’s “Liberation Trilogy,” a study of the U.S. Army in the war in Europe. The first volume, An Army at Dawn, won the Pulitzer Prize for History in 2003. In The Day of Battle we are treated to an army that has learned much from the severe trial of the North African Campaign. Atkinson’s tale unfolds from a number of human perspectives. Obviously, the senior officers appear quite often, sometimes with searing critical evaluations. But he also follows the experiences of other, lesser known people, common soldiers, battalion and company commanders, reporters, an OSS agent, and even some civilians trapped in the war. The work also ranges from high strategy sessions in palatial villas to desperate fighting in squalid conditions. If Day of Battle is the U.S. Army as it grew into an increasingly effective combat force, Atkinson does not neglect our Allies or our enemies. The book ends with the liberation of Rome, fittingly just two days before D-Day in Normandy would turn the Italian Front into a footnote.


The operations of the 6th Army Group, one of three Allied army groups in northwestern Europe from the liberation to the fall of Germany, have largely been neglected in the literature, often seemingly dismissed as little more than a side-show, cleaning up southern France and then anchoring the Allied right against the Alps. First to the Rhine is a very successful attempt to change that view. The 6th Army Group, under the relatively little known Lt. Gen. Jacob L. Devers, was a rather hastily assembled Franco-American force. Yet it undertook one of the most successful amphibious landings in the war, cleared Provence and southeastern France of the enemy (during which Audie Murphy earned his Medal of Honor), took part in some very tough winter fighting in the Vosges Mountains, and then went on the liberate Alsace and conquer southern Germany, despite the fact that most Allied resources were being funneled to the “main front” in Normandy. First to the Rhine gives us a comprehensive look at these operations, as well as the armies, commanders, and troops who carried them out, setting their efforts within the larger framework of the war.
World War II: Pacific


A well written account of the carrier Franklin (CV-13), an Essex Class ship commissioned in early 1944. For the first half of Inferno, we learn much about the day-to-day routine of the crew’s life on an American carrier in the Pacific, as well as the workings of the fleet, and the missions the ship, her aircraft, and her crew were called upon to perform during the great the great offensives of 1944 and early 1945. To that point, this could be a book about any carrier. But on March 19, 1945 a single 250-kilogram bomb, struck just right, touched off an inferno that left nearly 800 of her crew dead, half again as many injured, and the ship herself a twisted wreck on the verge of sinking. From that point, we have a very different story, an epic of human courage and endurance, as the crew and those of other vessels, work desperately to save the ship, a task at which was ultimately successful, so that the ship survived to make home. The author, a former Air Force officer who has written several works in military history, has skillfully blended some very fine historical research and writing with numerous first hand accounts by surviving crewmen, to tell an often gripping story of the war at sea.


China’s struggle with Japan has been poorly served in the literature of World War II. In The Dragon’s War, Prof. Maochhun Yu of the U.S. Naval Academy presents one aspect of that struggle, the role China’s allies, including Russia as well as Britain and the U.S., in supporting and supplementing China’s efforts to cope with the Japanese invasion. As such, the book gives the reader an excellent overview of the contributions each of these countries made to China’s defense. We are treated to short looks at Russian and later American efforts to help raise, train, and equip Chinese forces, the operations of British and American special warfare forces efforts in China, which were often not welcome by the Chinese, and, of course, Allied efforts to unite all Chinese factions under a unified command. These efforts were motivated by the political and strategic goals of the Allied powers, which were not necessarily those of China, and which were often influenced by business and economic concerns that were not necessarily in the best interests of the Allies themselves. A useful contribution to understanding the war in China and what came afterwards.

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Other


The first comprehensive treatment of the subject, War Elephants ranges from ancient times to the present, over virtually the entire Eastern Hemisphere, and along the way manages to dip into biology and psychology, myth and history, and much more. In the process, the work gives us a look at “recruiting,” training, care and feeding, organization and equipment, tactics, and numerous, often quite detailed, examples of the use of elephants in warfare, not only as combatants but also for transportation and engineering duties. Important reading for anyone with an interest in ancient history, the Middle East, India, and China, and entertaining reading for anyone else.


As the subtitle indicates, Volunteers on the Veld is a study of the “auxiliary” forces of the British Army, the Militia, Yeomanry, and the Volunteers, during the “Boer War.” It uses the war to examine the volunteer tradition in Britain (though the Militia was on paper a compulsory home-defense force), and how it evolved when the Empire found itself fighting a “real” war for the first time in generations. Primarily an organizational and social history (“Why did men volunteer?” is a main theme), the author concludes that economic hardship was by no means a prominent motivation. The performance of the volunteer services in the war, and the war’s impact of their further development and professionalization are given extensive coverage.


Creating Military Power is a collection of essays that attempt to address the question of “Why are some states, at some times, better able to translate their basic material and human strengths into fighting power?” Most of the ten essays focus on specific military establishments, post-Meiji Japan, Saddamite Iraq, contemporary Britain and America, Egypt in the 1960s and 1970s, and the early Irish Republic. Others look at specific issues, such as a comparative views of the rise of naval aviation, the effect of alliances, and the interplay of culture, institutions, society, and political dynamics. The work takes a poli-sci approach, and is marred by a number of
historical errors of fact (e.g., placing the defense of Wake Island in 1942) and interpretation (e.g., a total failure to consider the influence of inter-war arms limitation treaties on the rise of naval air power). Nevertheless, it is likely to be of interest to students of military effectiveness and countries considered in the essays.


World War I has been receiving more attention in recent years, but most treatments have been focused on the Allies, most notably the British and Americans. In The German Army at Passchendaele we get a rare look at one of the war’s most notable battles from the German side, and, even better, an account that includes the perspective of the men in the trenches. By combining research in official documents, a survey of earlier historical writings, and material garnered from personal accounts, such as letters, memoirs, and diaries, plus extensive interviews with surviving veterans, the book provides a multi-level look at the protracted struggle in the mud of Flanders that has set the standard against which all poor generalship must be measured. An important read for anyone interested in the Great War.

The American Military Experience


An anthology of 23 mostly first hand accounts of notable moments in the history of the Marine Corps. The selections range from pieces written as early as 1814 to as recently as 2007, and cover events from the storming of Derna in 1805 to that of Fallujah in 2004. Items include excerpts from official reports, memoirs, letters, histories, and newspaper dispatches. Although one could quibble over items that “should” have been included (e.g., the “Banana Wars” or more on World War I), given that the “pool” of possible entries is huge, the selections examine some of the defining moments in Marine history, and this work can serve as a useful introduction to the subject for anyone needing one.


A review of the role of Congress in war making. After an introductory chapter on the question of the “proper” role of congress in war, there are chapters devoted to what constitutes a “declaration of war,” the Congressional role in “raising and maintaining” forces and making rules for their governance, strategy, oversight in time of war, and war termination. Although tersely written, the work covers a surprisingly complex subject well, exploring the ins and outs of how the congressional role in war making has evolved over the nearly 220 years since the ratification of the Constitution.


This useful book is a British, or more accurately a Canadian view of the war, in considerable detail. As a result, the causes considered critical by American historians tend to be downplayed here, such as the importance of impressment or of the continued presence on U.S. soil of British troops and of British subsidies to Indians leaders such as Tecumseh. Instead Latimer opts for the older view, that the war was prompted by expansionist ambitions, which, while not discounted, are no longer considered central by most American historians. That said, the book is otherwise a solid account, but told from the other side, which often gives throws interesting light on various events. For example, Latimer provides a much more complete account of Plattsburgh, the real decisive battle of the war than that found in most American works, which prefer to stress Jackson at New Orleans, a battle which had no effect whatsoever on the outcome.


Before he became a traitor, Benedict Arnold was one of the most outstanding American commanders of the Revolutionary War, and certainly among the most daring. In Benedict Arnold’s Army we have a very fine account of his most amazing undertaking, a 300 mile trek across the virtually unexplored Maine wilderness as part of an ambitions plan to capture Canada for the Patriot cause. Well written, the book gives us a very detailed account of the planning, organization, and conduct of the expedition, culminating in a very lively and vivid account of the American attempt to storm Quebec on the snowy night of December 30th, 1775, which came amazingly close to success. In the process, we learn much about the military practice of the age, as well as woodsmanship, and are given a look at many interesting characters who were connected with the expedition. An excellent read for anyone interested in military history.
Naval Operations

Largely viewed within the framework of the infantryman’s war, Korea was in addition a naval war of considerable proportions, and its outcome was heavily dependant upon naval operations. Yet accounts of the Navy’s role in the war have been rare, a problem that has plagued the fleet in all subsequent conflicts. In this work, noted naval historian Ed Marolda has collected seven essays and numerous “side bars” that explore the naval side of the Korean War. The essays, which cover operations by South Korean and Allied fleets as well as the U.S.N., by such noted historians as Thomas Buell and Malcolm Muir, Jr., deal with the role of sea power in all its manifestations, including the air and gunfire support of forces ashore, air combat, fleet operations, naval command, the integration of the fleet, and more. The “side bars” provide brief, but detailed looks at specific aspects of the war, from the carriers taking part to mine operations to President Truman’s dislike of Mainers, and even the “Bridges at Toko-ri.” An important book for anyone interested in naval history or the world wars at sea.


An analytical look at the use and effects of the naval blockade over the past 250 years. It opens with a chapter surveying the origins and history of the maritime blockade in the period, and the evolution of international law on the subject. There follow chapters focused on particular cases of blockade; the French Wars of 1793-1815, the Anglo-American Wars of 1775-1815, the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), World War I (1914-1918), two for each World War II theater. It ends with chapters on the blockade in non-war situations, to enforce sanctions and in “peace operations,” and on the evolution of international law on the subject. The numerous tables cover blockades in terms of ships taken, imports and exports, and more. An excellent treatment, the book does overlook the use of blockade during smaller wars, such as the Franco-Prussian War, War of the Pacific, or the Balkan Wars.


A very readable treatment of Australian naval history from the earliest settlements, through the Provincial navies of the nineteenth century, the establishment of the Royal Australian Navy in the early twentieth century, and its subsequent history through two world wars and numerous smaller conflicts right up to the present. There is a surprising amount of detail in the work, with a number of excellent short battle pieces and a discussion of the evolution of the Australia’s defense policy within the framework of its history and political development. Coverage of Australian-U.S. naval relations is somewhat uneven; while several pages discuss the impact of the “Great White Fleet” on Australian defense thinking. No attention at all is paid to the 1925 visit of the much larger U.S. Fleet, which led many Australian political and military leaders to conclude that America was more important to Australian security than Britain. There are also a number of small, but annoying errors of fact; the figures for the total fleet tonnage assigned the U.S., Britain, and Japan under the 1922 Naval Arms Limitation Treaty are wrong, the battleship California did not capsize at Pearl Harbor, and so forth. Nevertheless, a useful book for anyone interested in naval history or the world wars at sea.


This work, by former Navy SEAL turned defense analyst and historian, is an excellent follow up to the author’s previous book, The Sea Rover’s Practice: Pirate Tactics and Techniques, 1630-1730 (Washington: Potomac Books, 2005). Where that work looked at the “art and science” of piracy, The Buccaneer’s Realm looks at the social, cultural, and economic side aspects of piracy. In 22 chapters, it looks at almost literally everything about pirate life; safe havens, what might be termed “recruitment and training,” sex, argot, religion, honor among thieves, medical services, race relations, logistics, and more. The reader is also treated to a number of rattling good battle pieces and the efforts of the Spanish Crown to cope with piracy. And then there are the ten appendices, that cover such topics as the “table of organization” of a pirate ship, lists of notable captains and their vessels, to books by “veteran” pirates, money, and even how to throw a piratical barbecue. A good read for anyone interested in maritime history.
NYMAS Winter-Spring 2008 Schedule

Mar 28, “Kandahar Tour: The Royal Canadian Regiment in Afghanistan, 2007,” Lee Windsor, Gregg Centre for the Study of War and Society, University of New Brunswick
Apr 11-12, Special Friday Evening/All-day Saturday Conference, “Selected Issues in US Foreign Policy: Past, Present and Future
Apr 18, “Rebellion in the Ranks: Mutinies of the American Revolution,” John A. Nagy, Author
May 9, “The Perils of Peace: America's Struggle for Survival After Yorktown,” Thomas Fleming, Author
May 16, “Gouverneur Kemble Warren: The Final Casualty of the Civil War,” Frank Varney, William Paterson University of New Jersey
June 6, “Omar Bradley's D-Day,” John Prados, National Security Archive
June 13, “How Lee Lost & Grant Won the Civil War,” Ed H. Bonekemper, III, Author
June 20, “Recruiting Churchill's Army - What Went Wrong?” Dan David, NYMAS

NYMAS talks are free and open to the public. They are normally held on Friday evenings at the City University of New York Graduate Center, at 365 Fifth Avenue between 34th and 35th Streets from 7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m. Friday lectures are usually held on the 6th floor in Room 6-495, but confirmation should be obtained from the security desk in the lobby.

These talks are sponsored by the New York Military Affairs Symposium in conjunction with CUNY’s Conference on History and Politics, Dr. George D. Schwab, Director. NYMAS is associated with the Society for Military History, Region 2.

Speakers and topics may be subject to change without notice. A current schedule is available at the NYMAS website at http://nymas.org.

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