Notes
Slide Show
Outline
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Information Warfare
What is Is, Isn’t…
and How it Shapes National Security






  • Dr Dan Kuehl “kuehld@ndu.edu”
  • Information Resources Management College
  • National Defense University
  • “My Opinions…not the USG/DOD/NDU”
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The National Defense University
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4 Fundamental Changes
New Geostrategic Context

    • Cyberspace: new operational realm/battlespace
      • Dominant in business, politics, warfare
    • Convergence
      • Digital: 1110101110001010 = lingua franca
      • Information mediums (radio, TV, phone, etc)
    • Global Omnilinking
      • Electronic digital connectivity of people, organizations, governments…globally & instantly
    • Critical Infrastructure Protection
      • Opportunity….and vulnerability
      • Critical to advanced societies, but public/private links poorly understood
        • Roles and missions; what does “interagency” mean?


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Information & National Power
  • The information component
      • “Use of information content and technology as strategic instruments to shape fundamental political, economic, military and cultural forces on a long-term basis to affect the global behavior of governments, supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security”
          • Drs Dan Kuehl/Bob Neilson, Georgetown’s NSSQ 1999
          • President Ronald Reagan:
          • NSDD 130 (1984)
          • National Security Strategy (1987)

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Information Environment
  • Physical: “Ether”/Cyberspace/”eSpace”
    • Electronic connectivity
    • Physical space
      • Unique set of the laws of physics
  • Contextual: “influence/perception space”
      • “Cognitive Space” (Manuel Wik)
    • analogy: “political/economic environments”
      • Example: Serbian TV vs NATO 1999
    • If you lose the battle here, winning the other may not matter: Mogadishu, 1993
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The Origins: Command and Control Warfare C2W
  • “Military strategy that implements Information Warfare on the battlefield”
    • impact of the Gulf War 1990-91
  • “Integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, EW, and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence , degrade or destroy adversary C2 capabilities, while protecting friendly capabilities against such actions.”
        • MOP 30, 1993, Jt Pub 3-13.1 1996
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Information Operations
(Current but Evolving)

  • IO: “Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems, while defending one’s own information and information systems.”
    • IW: “IO conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries”       (Military)
    • IA = “IO that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.”     (Military, Federal/State/Local, and Civilian)
  • (DoDD 3600.1, Joint Doctrine 3-13, both 1998)
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Evolving IO
  • Joint Pub 3-13 under revision
        • At Joint Doctrine Center; impact of IO Roadmap and DOD Directive 3600
    • 2001 suggested changes: good
      • No longer “an integrating strategy” but rather “Unique type of military operations employing info assets”
      • Not the only tool with which to employ the “information element of national power”
      • Enabled by, but not the same as, C4I
        • Parable of “Six Blind Indians”
    • 2001 suggested changes: bad!
      • IO = Electronic + Perception ops
        • Delete physical attack/kinetic ops
          • (Focus on means vice intent)

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Evolving IO
    • “Actions taken to influence, affect or defend information, information systems and decision-making” (July 2002)


    • “DOD Employment of EW, Computer Network Operations, Psyop, Military Deception, and Opsec to affect or protect electronic systems, networks, perceptions, attitudes, or plans necessary for decision superiority and influence decision making” (August 2002)


    • “Integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, Computer Network Operations, Psyop, Military Deception, and Opsec to disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making and protect our own” (June 2003)


    • Were any of these “right”?

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IO Roadmap
SecDef 30 October 2003
  • IO as a core military competency, on par with air-ground-maritime-special ops
    • We must dominate the information spectrum
  • Core capabilities
    • EW, CNO, Psyop, Military Deception, Opsec
    • Why these five?
      • Immediate operational impact
      • Interdependent and require integration
      • Organize-Train-Equip implications
  • Supporting/Related functions
    • Physical attack and security, IA, Counter-Intel, Public Affairs, Civil-Military Ops
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Future IO
    • “Integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, Computer Network Operations, Psyop, Military Deception, and Opsec, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own”
        • DOD IO Roadmap, October 2003
          • Remember the old “C2W”?
        • Will shape DOD Policy and Joint Doctrine
    • Questions/Issues
      • Why not call this “IW” and leave IO for the broader scope of strategic activities
        • Information “Engagement”?  “Strategic Information”?
      • Focus is on means, not intent
        • Where did “effects-based” go?
      • Impact of budget/resource process



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IW / IO (dtk)
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National Security Strategy
Last Clinton NSS, December 2000
  • 3 Key pillars
    • Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
      • Vital national interest, use force to defend
      • “Partnership” of public-private sectors
    • Information Warfare/Operations (IW/IO)
      • Leading to Network Centric Ops -- Transformation?
    • Public Diplomacy/International Public Information (PD/IPI)…..”Softpower”, “Information Engagement”
      • “increasingly vital….transmit [our] message to people around the world” to “counter misinformation/incitement…mitigate conflict”
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Critical Infrastructure Protection
  • PCCIP to PDD 63 to National Plan to EO 13231 (CIP in Info Age)
    • Australia, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Canada, more
  • Dependency and Inter-dependencies create the Vulnerability
  • National Strategy to Secure Cyber Space
    • Weak? Too much industry influence?
    • Administration commitment?
  • National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets
    • Administration focused here?
  • HSPD-7 “Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection
    • Dec 17, 2003
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“Strategic Communications”
  • From NSDD 130 (’84) to PDD 68 and IPI (’99) to…
  • “Strategic Influence” is a strategic instrument…and always has been
  • Satellite TV is everywhere
    • “Rock & Roll” Bridge
    • Jakarta Cable has Fox
    • Live from the WTC
  • An Internet Intifada
    • “eIntifada – Interfada - eJihad”
    • Al Jazeera
    •  “4000 Jews”
  • White House Office of Global Communications
    • OSI RIP
    • State’s Int’l Info Programs

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National Security Strategy
First Bush NSS, October 2002
  • “Infrastructure”, “Information Ops”
  • “Public Diplomacy/Information”
    • 3 references
  • No sense of information as power or environment: no sense of its impact
  • No coordination of Administration efforts
    • Diplomatically, militarily, economically


        • ”Kuehl/Neilson, ”No Strategy for an Information Age”, USNIP 9/03
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"Air Force"
  • Air Force
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Service IO Matrix
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Joint Information Operations
  • Joint Pub 3-13
    • October 1998
    • In revision
    • Summer 2004?
  • Organize: IO Cell
    • Combat Cmds have
  • Plan: IO Annex to Theater Campaign
    • deliberate – crisis
  • Train & Exercise
    • interagency - civil  sector combined
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"Canada - UK- Aussies"
  • Canada - UK- Aussies
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Russian IO
  • “Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation” (RF)
        • “Putin Doctrine”, 9 Sept 2000
    • Protect “national interests…in the information sphere”
      • Government-directed (not a partnership)
      • Reliable info on the RF
      • Spiritual life of the RF
      • Russian Information Technology industry
    • Russian efforts in UN
      • Gen Assembly Res 53/70, 4 December 1998
      • Gen Assembly Res 54/49, 1 December 1999
        • follow-up work in progress
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Chinese IW
  • “Unrestricted Warfare”
      • “Go Beyond the Limits Warfare”
    • PLA Cols Qiao Liang, Wang Xiangsui
    • terror, drugs, environment, computer viruses = asymmetrical warfare
    • “takes nonmilitary forms and military forms and creates war on many fronts.  War of the future.”
    • “fight according to your rules?  No.”
    • official strategy/doctrine?  NO
    • heated/hidden internal debate? YES
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Chinese IW
  • China usually sees IW as strictly military
    • US sees IO more broadly
  • China overlays IW with ideology
    • Mao Zedong, Sun Tzu
      • “New People’s War”--“Overcome superior with inferior”
  • China emphasizes non-technological
  • IW is an unconventional warfare weapon
    • Not a battlefield force enabler/multiplier
    • Info campaign precludes the need for military action!---a preemption weapon
        • Jim Mulvenon, “PLA in Info Age”, RAND
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Joint Vision 2010/2020
  • Hypothesis
    • new organizations employ new doctrines to conduct fundamentally new forms of war
      • Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
      • information superiority = sine qua non
  • New Concepts and “Transformation”
    • Dominant Battlespace Knowledge
    • Network Centric Warfare/Operations
    • US military dependence on global “Reachback”
  • “Fog & Friction”
    • end of it?  NO!  new kinds?  YES!
      • “datasmog”, “information overload”


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Information Superiority
What is it? How do you Measure it?
  • Air Force
    • “That degree of dominance in the info domain which allows friendly forces the ability to collect, control, exploit, and defend info without effective opposition”
  • Joint Doctrine
    • “The capability to collect, process, & disseminate an uninterrupted flow of info while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same”
    • ______________________________________________________


  • Air Superiority (AFDD-1 and Joint Doctrine)
    • “That degree of dominance in the air [info] battle…which permits the conduct of [info] operations…at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.”
  • Information Superiority (DTK):
    • “the ability to use the information environment to our advantage while preventing the enemy from effectively using it or obstructing our use.”

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Network Centric Warfare
  • Network-Centric…
    • Thinking…NOT simply Comms/IT/Signals/J6
  • Interlinked Grids (technological and human)
    • Sensors: gather data
    • C2: transform data to knowledge - wisdom
    • Shooters: apply power
  • Evolving concepts/terminology
    • From Firepower Platforms to Networks
      • Network Based Defence (Sweden)
      • Networked Enabled Capability (UK)
      • Network Enabled Operations – Netcentricity
        • Adm Art Cebrowski, USNIP Jan 98
        • Garstka & Stein, NCW, CCRP/NDU Press 1999, www.dodccrp.org

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Organizational Change
Operational
  • Merger of Space and Strategic Commands
      • JTF-CNO and IO mission
      • Role of DirNSA
  • New Northern Command
    • Support to Dept of Homeland Security
      • HLS mission includes cybersecurity
      • Homeland “defense” vs “security”?
    • Mission-Resources mismatch?
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Organizational Change
Policy
  • Old ASD/C3I now ASD/NII
    • Networks-Information Integration mission
    • Keeps Info Assurance
  • USD(I) has intelligence function
    • Also has Information Operations
  • Questions…
    • Is Intelligence right/best place for IO?
      • Especially since IO includes CND
  • Role of USD(P)?


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Information Power…
Who’s in Charge?
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What’s Lacking
  • Who and Where do we go for the COGs of Information Power?
    • National Information Council?
  • What do need from them?
    • National Information Strategy
  • What are we lacking?  Why don’t we have one?
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What’s Needed
  • Information-age corollary to the “Long Telegram”
  • New strategy is not “Containment”…it’s CONNECTIVITY!
  • Free flows of information enhance
    • Democracy
    • Human rights
    • Economic development
    • Peace
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Q & A