Mighty in War: The
Role of Matilda of Tuscany in the War Between Pope Gregory VII and
Emperor Henry IV
A Bit of Background
Matilda of Tuscany in one
of three women entombed in St. Peter's basilica in the
Vatican. The
countess earned her place in the basilica and in history by defending
the papal cause when a dispute between Pope Gregory VII and King Henry
IV of Germany escalated into open war in 1080. The war was part of a
larger series of events that came to be known as the Investiture
Controversy, one of the most-studied subjects in medieval European
history. The war itself was, however, last studied more than a century
ago. There is no study devoted to the military career of Matilda of
Tuscany either in the war between Gregory VII and Henry IV or during
the remaining 30 years of her life.
In the Introduction to the
dissertation I discuss the reasons for this situation. Since the 19th
century, military historians have treated the history of war largely
as the history of battle. This approach was especially unsuited to
medieval warfare which in the past twenty-five years has been
increasingly analyzed as a warfare of position and attrition. Because
women are generally smaller than men and the sources do not report
their training in arms, historians using the battle-centered approach
equated medieval reports of women's participation in warfare with
those describing the appearance of saints and angels on the
battlefield. The recognition of the centrality of sieges and the
importance of logistics makes possible an understanding of the role of
women in such warfare. During the same time, study of family history
has clarified the military burdens that fell to all landholders
including women and the religious. My dissertation studies the role of
Matilda of Tuscany in the war between Gregory VII and Henry IV by
approaching it simply as an 11th-century campaign.
The study of any campaign
properly begins with the terrain, the theatre of operations. As
marquis of Tuscany and count of Mantua, Ferrara, Modena, Reggio and
Brescia, Matilda of Tuscany controlled the trans-Apennine routes.
Protecting these roads was the reason for the creation of the March of
Tuscany in Carolingian times. In Chapter 1, "The Military
Geography," examination of the known movements of Henry IV shows
that during his campaign against the pope the king made almost no use
of the trans-Apennine routes. Examples are drawn from earlier German
expeditions to Italy.
In Chapter 2, "The
Order of Battle," a study of the participants on all sides of the
conflict makes clear that there was no order of battle in the usual
sense. Because of conflict in Germany, Henry IV had to leave his most
loyal supporters behind as he went into Italy. It was this turmoil
that made settling matters with the pope vital. Only the pope could
perform the imperial coronation, and until he had the imperial title
Henry's position in Germany was vulnerable. He had, therefore, to rely
on his supporters in Italy for the Italian campaign.
The prosopography of the
leading families in Tuscany and the Po valley, especially those who
would gain the most by replacing Matilda, gives some indication of who
these supporters were. Identifications made in the 18th century are
called into question. Similar investigation allows some conclusions
about the identity of Matilda of Tuscany's supporters. Pope Gregory's
alliance with the Normans in southern Italy and the consequent
involvement of the Byzantine emperor is examined. The extent of the
preparations for the war, on all sides, is shown. The prominence of
paid troops, noted by Waitz in the 19th century, is confirmed.
In Chapter 3, "The
Campaign of 1081-84," all of the known actions of the campaign
are presented in roughly chronological order, and explanations of the
military purpose of each is attempted. Special attention is paid to
the (in)famous looting of the monasteries in 1082, an action which
allowed Matilda of Tuscany to send a large amount of precious metal to
Pope Gregory. The failed efforts to capture the episcopal castle of
Moriana, near Lucca, and Henry IV's precautions against a campaign by
the anti-king Hermann of Salm are discussed.
Just as the preparations
for the war revealed a great deal about the conduct of the campaign,
the actions that took place afterward say a lot about Matilda of
Tuscany's military capacity and methods. Chapter 4, "The
Inter-Bellum" discusses the battle at Sorbara (2 July 1084) and
the march to Rome in support of Gregory VII's successor, Victor III.
Sorbara is the best-documented of any of the actions of the war.
Shortly after Henry IV left Italy, Matilda inflicted a bloody defeat
on his supporters in northern Italy and showed herself well able to
protect her position. The campaign of 1090-97 is briefly commented on,
but this subject deserves a separate and detailed study of its own.
The chapter ends when Matilda returns to Tuscany accompanying Pope
Urban II as he returns from the triumphant preaching of the first
Crusade.
The Conclusions discuss
Matilda's campaign in terms of the prevailing paradigm of medieval
warfare, Vegetian theory, and show that she waged a campaign that
conforms to the expectations of this model. That she was active in the
campaign is shown from numerous excerpts from contemporary writers who
knew her. Particular attention is paid to the Treatise on the Song
of Songs of John of Mantua which is little-studied. Matilda of
Tuscany did not defeat Henry IV. His inability to force her to battle
and to enforce his judicial sentence against her made him look weak
and ineffective. No king can survive that.
